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Sexual Minorities in Legal Academia:
A Retrospection on Community,
Action, Remembrance, and Liberation
Francisco Valdes
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, pioneering members of the U.S. legal
academy ﬁnally were able to activate, within the structures of our profession,
that self-liberating sense of individual and collective consciousness that had
fueled a (conﬂicted) understanding of sexual minority-hood among women
and men with same-sex orientations in the U.S. throughout the twentieth
century,1 but especially after the 1969 Stonewall Riots.2
During these decades, lesbian and gay pioneers in the U.S. legal
professoriate educated and agitated for equality and recognition not only
in law and policy, but also in legal education speciﬁcally, including in the
operations of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS). As outlined
below, a small group of these pioneers (and allies) had managed by 1983–84
to establish formally and functionally a “section” of the AALS, and by 1990
this Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues (and allies) in turn had nudged
the AALS into adopting a nondiscrimination policy specifying coverage of
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sexual orientation.3 Both were historic ﬁrsts in U.S. legal culture, and each
established new baselines for the future conﬁguration and administration of
legal education in the U.S.
By the mid-1990s, Stonewall and the nation’s legal academy ﬁnally had met.
Crucially, in the years since, this section has continued serving as crucible,
spearhead and vehicle for sexual minority faculty and friends to conduct
academic and community-building programs in the continuing pursuit of equal
justice in the legal academy and throughout society. As the history outlined
below shows, this section provided the means by which sexual minorities
in legal education mobilized for collective political action, aﬀecting both our
particular workplace environments and profession and our basic normative
positions in society. Despite the remarkable and tangible progress during the
late twentieth century, these were times of acute political conﬂict and cultural
backlash, oftentimes focused on the inclusion or exclusion of sexual minorities
from social and legal frameworks.
By century’s turn, the intensifying cultural clashes and political polarization
that had gripped and split the nation—the so-called “culture wars”—had spilled
over into the nation’s legal academy.4 Those dynamics increasingly set the
zeitgeist, and basic terms of engagement, for our work as a section during those
acutely conﬂicted times. Those dynamics have not changed fundamentally
today, and perhaps have grown worse.
Thus, like so many others before and since, 1997–98 was a year that brought
with it the best—but also among the worst—of times.
In many ways, 1997–98 simply continued the pioneering work of earlier
generations and section members across the U.S. legal academy in pursuing
sexual orientation justice across legal education generally, and within the legal
professoriate speciﬁcally. But that year we broke new ground in the Annual
Program, held in January 1998, centered on cutting-edge issues focused on
sexual minorities and in racial and ethnic communities. Yet, high moments
were met with historically unprecedented lows: legislative and administrative
attacks speciﬁcally and viciously targeting our pro-equality eﬀorts, which
(surprisingly to us) came directly from very senior levels of the U.S. government.
Like so many others, this year was indeed one of high highs and low lows.
3.

For more detailed accounts, see the Cain & Love (Cincinnati: Before and After, 66 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 460 (2017)), Cox (Time for a Change: 20 Years after the “Working Group Principles, 66 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 531 (2017)), and Leonard (Fortuitously Present at the Creation, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 473 (2017))
essays in this mini-symposium; see also infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (on early
sexual minority activism within the legal professorate). In later years, the section name was
modiﬁed to today’s name: Section on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues.
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See infra note 6 and sources cited therein (on the backlash politics of the culture wars); see
also Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, “Kulturkampf[s]” or “ﬁt[s] of spite”?: Taking the Academic Culture Wars
Seriously, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1309, 1310–48 (2005) (focusing speciﬁcally on the culture
wars’ impact on academia).
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Recalling our Section activities in 1997–98 thus presents both a history of
and one model for current and future legal academics to pursue an activist
agenda promoting or protecting equality in the profession.
That year was a period of culture wars, not unlike many since then, including
right now. It was a period of conﬂict and debate in the legal academy as
well, particularly about the signiﬁcance of diversity and sameness-diﬀerence.
Despite those turbulent crosscurrents, in that year the section succeeded in
building principled solidarity across diﬀerence and in vindicating normative
principles about equal justice among our multiply diverse ranks, by focusing
on the intersections of race, ethnicity, and orientation in law and society. Now,
two decades on—and as many of the sexual minority pioneers who broke the
barriers of entry for the rest of us are beginning, or approaching, retirement
from our shared profession—is a timely occasion to reﬂect, critically and selfcritically, on the forward-looking insights and lessons that might be drawn from
our recent and continuing histories with social, professional, institutional, and
systemic forms of privilege and prejudice.
In 1997–98, for the ﬁrst time ever, the section decided to devote its main
annual event to the variegated interplay of race, ethnicity, and sexual
orientation in contemporary U.S. law and society. Presenting a diverse panel
of prominent scholars,5 this program signiﬁed a substantive intervention in the
then-developing ﬁelds of critical race theory, LatCrit theory, and gay/lesbian
legal scholarship. As a knowledge production exercise, this multifaceted
intervention was designed to nudge orientation into the discourses on race
and ethnicity, as well as to nudge race and ethnicity into the emergent legal
scholarship focused on the socio-legal condition of U.S. sexual minorities.
But more than to “build bridges” among “diﬀerent” minorities, the point
was to highlight how we already constitute overlapping multiple communities.
Because at the time sexual orientation was coded white while race and ethnicity
were coded straight, this program was designed to showcase in substantive and
symbolic terms how race, ethnicity, gender, orientation and similar identity
constructs already and concurrently populate “diﬀerent” U.S. communities
and lives—and to do so precisely in a time of rising anti-equality backlash
5.

Titled “Race, Ethnicity and Sexual Orientation: Crossing New Intersections in Law and Scholarship,” our
program was co-sponsored by the Section on Minority Groups and featured Angela Gilmore
of Nova Southeastern as moderator; Elvia R. Arriola of the University of Texas, Barbara J.
Cox of California Western School of Law, Clark J. Freshman of the University of Miami,
Peter Kar Yu Kwan of Santa Clara University, Kendall Thomas of Columbia University,
and Robert S. Westley of Tulane University. Reﬂecting our goals that year, the program
description stated: “Legal scholarship on sexual orientation has proliferated during the past
several years, while race and ethnicity scholarship continues to develop in the form of critical
race theory and, more recently, LatCrit theory. However, existing legal discourses about
race and ethnicity and about sexual orientation sometimes seem unduly unconnected, even
though each probably can help to illuminate issues of importance to the others. This panel
brings together a diverse group of scholars to consider the intersection of race, ethnicity and
sexual orientation, thereby helping to initiate a broader conversation about the interplay
of these constructs in law and society, and also within queer legal theory and critical race
theory.”
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using similar ways and means against us all.6 In broad terms, the ultimate
aim of our 1997–98 section program was to help cultivate a mutual sense of
substantive, informed, and principled solidarity based on shared values and
aspirations, and across multiple vectors of diﬀerence based on history, identity,
or circumstance, to provide fuel and glue for social justice activism as diverse
academics facing times marked by intensifying social reaction and legal
regression.
Consequently, timing was equally key.
This intervention—if one recalls that historic moment speciﬁcally within the
U.S. legal academy—took place during a time when notions and questions
of “diﬀerence” and “sameness” preoccupied much of the progressive wing
within the legal professoriate, generating doubts about substantive solidarity
among “diﬀerent” identity groups across varied social justice issues, which
stymied coalitional action and, ultimately, social justice progress. During that
time, within the legal academy the similarly “diﬀerent” genres of ﬂourishing
scholarship—each focusing chieﬂy either on gender, or race, or ethnicity, or
sexual orientation—oftentimes seemed likewise preoccupied with samenessdiﬀerence questions.7 These parallel discursive eﬀorts oftentimes yielded
incisive texts relating to one or another identity category, but rarely had our
respective labors led up to collaborative initiatives to tackle professional,
institutional, or social injustice.8 It took us the better part of a zigzagging
decade to begin transcending those paralyzing intergroup dynamics.9
This program was but part of that long, multifaceted, still-ongoing group
eﬀort.
This academic status quo reﬂected the prevailing zeitgeist of the “culture
wars” during that (and this) time.
6.

To recall a sense of those times, see Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Kenneth L.
Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 677 (1991); Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 1467 (1996).
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For a sampling, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Diﬀerence/Deviance
Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The
Diﬀerence It Makes, 2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1992); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/
Diﬀerence Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 296; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
585–616 (1990); Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice,
3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33 (1995); Symposium, Diﬀerence, Solidarity and Law: Building
Latina/o Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19 CHICANO–LATINO L. REV. 1 (1998).
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See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical
Race Theory and Antiracist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999) (on race and sexuality).

9.

For an overview, see Francisco Valdes, Theorizing “OutCrit” Theories: Coalitional Method and
Comparative Jurisprudential Experience—RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265
(1999).
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All around us, the politics of reaction against “liberal” legal gains of the
past century—including those of the Square Deal, New Deal, Fair Deal, Great
Society and second Reconstruction—seemed to run rampant with ever-greater
vengeance to resurrect pre-civil rights America, both formally and normatively.
The result was a contraction of lived justice speciﬁcally within and among
communities that traditionally had been excluded from the academy, and
subordinated across society. Within the legal academy, these politics belittled
and attacked the very diversiﬁcation of legal education that, ﬁnally, had allowed
so many members of this section an opportunity to practice the profession
after generations of de jure and de facto exclusions based intersectionally
on gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and other similar identitarian
constructs.10
Equally important, therefore, this program endeavored to help facilitate
coalitional networks across and among multiply diverse, queer, critical, and
outsider scholars with a common interest in equal justice. This program was
designed not only to reﬂect but also to project the growing multidimensional
diversiﬁcation of the U.S. legal academy generally in terms of gender, race,
ethnicity, and orientation. More particularly, it also was designed to underscore
and embrace the homegrown diversiﬁcation of our section membership
speciﬁcally in terms of race and ethnicity that had occurred in the prior years.
Perhaps most especially, then, this program aimed to recognize and
build on the pipelining work of earlier section leaders, who proactively had
recruited section members of color for service on the Executive Committee—
myself included. It is no coincidence that, starting in the 1990s, the section
increasingly elected more chairs of color.11 Building on this record, in 1997–98
the section also established a mentoring program, an eﬀort driven by the hope
that sexual minorities newly entering the legal professoriate over time would
help to make a diﬀerence for the better in the publications, classrooms, and
institutions of the legal academia.12
During that time, however, the tensions, gaps, and disorganizing
uncertainties resulting from the prevalent politics of reaction and our
own “sameness/diﬀerence dilemma”13 seemed to inhibit in untold ways the
10.

For an informative historical account of the identity politics shaping legal education’s
formalization in the U.S. during the nineteenth century and since, including the systemic
exclusion of blacks, women, Jews, immigrants, and poor persons in favor of “white males”,
see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE
1980S, 81–102 (1983).

11.

Before 1997–1998, the ﬁrst and only section chair of color had been Robert P. Wasson of
Suﬀolk University Law School, in 1993–94.

12.

This section eﬀort was spearheaded initially by Kellye Testy, whose later career personiﬁed
the vision motivating this program. Just last year, Dean Testy became president-elect of the
Association of American Law Schools. See Kellye Y. Testy, Presidential Address: Why Law Matters,
AALS NEWS (Ass’n of Am. Law Schs., Washington D.C.), Feb. 2016, at 1; Kellye Y. Testy,
2016 AALS Annual Meeting Presidential Address: Why Law Matters, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 707 (2016).

13.

See Williams and other sources cited supra note 7 (on law, diﬀerence, identity, and equality).
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potential for coalitional enterprise among various outsider communities, both
within and beyond the academy. During that time, we were more likely to read
about conﬂict than cooperation among out-group communities in various
social, political, and economic settings.14 Time and again—as with the steady
judicial rollback and demonization of aﬃrmative action in opinions ranging
from Regents of the University of California v. Bakke15 two decades earlier to Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena16 only two years earlier—we had seen the raw might of
legal reaction but had no ready levers of power with which to counteract
eﬀectively, despite all our training and knowledge and privilege; more often
than not, we had been reduced to mutual exchanges of academic outrage
while unjust retrenchment marched on in the streets, schools, and squares of
the country.
In myriad ways, the powerful combination of reaction and diﬀerence had
impeded our capacity as legally trained professionals to act collectively—
collaboratively as a community—in favor of social justice, whether within or
beyond our own workplace: the legal academy.
And then, not so suddenly, 1997–98 put the stakes and consequences of
those dynamics and impediments squarely in front of us—as a profession and,
even more particularly, as a section—when federal policy in the form of the socalled Solomon Amendments speciﬁcally targeted us, and our students, with
classically invidious lawmaking.
It was, recall, a time of great ﬂux: the best and worst of times.
After all, 1997 also had begun on the heels of the 1996 Supreme Court
opinion in Romer v. Evans,17 and with that historic text still fresh on everyone’s
minds. Romer, the ﬁrst progay opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court since the
cruel year of 1986, had struck down the recently enacted Amendment 2 to the
Colorado Constitution, which had prohibited any state entity from adopting
antidiscrimination legal protections covering sexual orientation. Colorado’s
constitutional ban on the prohibition of homophobia in turn was an expression
of the more general state of aﬀairs prevalent during that era, which then was
still ruled by the Bowers regime; exactly a decade earlier, in Bowers v. Hardwick,18 a
bare majority of the Supreme Court had upheld a general antisodomy statute
as applied to same-sex couplings in ringingly laudatory terms. Invoking
everything from God and Civilization to Democracy and Morality, their
opining had ushered an era of homophobic license to discriminate, and even
criminalize, gay people and life with virtual impunity.
14.

For one example, see Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National
Imagination, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1395 (1997).

15.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

16.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).

17.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

18.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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In eﬀect, if not intent, Bowers had instituted a new open season of
homophobia across the U.S. social landscape. A decade later, Romer had left
Bowers intact, but concluded that Colorado had gone too far. For good reason,
the section’s previous annual program had been devoted to Romer.19
However, the Colorado legislature was not the only institution taking
advantage of Bowers’ invitation to bash gays under color of law. Congress
too had gotten into the act, and avidly so: That same decade, Congress had
decided to retaliate against us, the legal education profession, for endeavoring
to end sexual orientation discrimination on law school campuses. Enacting
legislation targeting law schools and law students, the federal government
now demanded that our profession become complicit in the practice of
discrimination in our very workplaces. It was eﬀectively a demand that we
reintroduce rank de jure discrimination onto law school campuses. What
would we do?
What could we do?
Driven by shared conviction and collective umbrage, that same year the
section stepped up to the plate, organizing an unprecedented coalitional
campaign undertaken with and by the AALS, the Society of American Law
Teachers (SALT) and other groups or individuals, to neutralize or repeal these
invidious measures. Our aim was to change an act of Congress. Our goal
was to protect our profession and students from the personal and systemic
consequences of compelled participation in de jure bigotry. Our means was
loosely coordinated community action. Despite the ﬂashes of tension and
periods of tedium entailed by this work, the tenacity and teamwork of so many
“diﬀerent” actors halted the wholesale betrayal of equal justice then being
demanded by federal law.
That campaign entailed a year of public fora, private meetings, lobbying,
and similar activities that put a premium both on individual initiative and
responsibility as well as on mutual cooperation and accommodation. During
the span of that year, many acts by many persons slowly but surely made the
positive, incremental diﬀerence—acts ranging from letter writing to public
protests and discrete behind-the-scenes politicking—undertaken personally,
yet collectively, by untold numbers of diversely situated individuals. Indeed,
perhaps the most magical part of those days was the sustained willingness of
so many “diﬀerent” folks to collaborate patiently and against all odds to undo
an unjust law.
That our motley eﬀorts succeeded at all was crucial for that pivotal moment
in the history of our profession. That we succeeded, even in this limited and
fragile way, shows the latent power of individuals, acting collectively through
responsive institutions, that always is ours. That we remember those unlikely
eﬀorts and imperfect gains today—and learn self-critically from the experience
for tomorrow—is most important now, and going forward.
19.

Titled “Evans v. Romer and Beyond,” that program was organized by 1996–97 section Chair
Jane Dolkart of Southern Methodist University Law School.
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At issue in 1997–98 was our core normative commitment to equal treatment
regardless of identity.20 This commitment had found expression as formal
institutional policy less than a decade before: With this section again leading
the way, and following the example of over 150 localities with policies
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, the House of Representatives
of the AALS had voted unanimously in 1990 to amend AALS Bylaw 6–4,
adding sexual orientation to its nondiscrimination policy.21 Subsequently,
the AALS Executive Committee enacted Regulation 6.19, mandating that
schools receive written employer assurances of nondiscrimination before
allowing them on-campus access. Given the times, of course, these policies
had attracted traditionalist backlash, including the military’s adamant refusal
to abide by the bylaw regulation. Like any other discriminatory employer, the
military therefore was barred from recruiting on most law school campuses on
the basis of its de jure discrimination regarding sexual orientation and gender.
In response, Congress in the 1990s passed two Solomon Amendments—
so named after their principal sponsoring lawmaker—that threatened
various types of federal funding to law schools and their parent universities,
including, most notably, student ﬁnancial aid. “Solomon I” aﬀected Defense
Department funds, while “Solomon II” aﬀected various grant funds from
various other federal departments, including Education, Labor, and the like.
Most signiﬁcantly, Solomon II aﬀected ﬁnancial aid funds that targeted the
most economically vulnerable law students from coast to coast.
From our perspective, this legislation’s coercive eﬀects directly threatened
two interests crucial to legal education: ﬁrst, the bias-free environment that is
the normative ideal in legal education and, second, the availability of federal
assistance for deserving students who need ﬁnancial aid to secure a formal
legal education. Moreover, this legislation was invidious because it eﬀectively
compelled the legal education profession to “choose” between two (sometimes
overlapping) classes of students—those who needed to ﬁnance their education
and those who needed protection from orientation or gender discrimination.
Considering neither class of student expendable, we chose to resist this false,
destructive, and arbitrary forced choice. In 1997, neither result was acceptable
to us because both were unjust to our students—and a stain on our profession.
Nonetheless, given the importance of federal student ﬁnancial aid funds,
the AALS reluctantly amended its nondiscrimination policy to “excuse” oncampus access speciﬁcally for the military, only as required by law, and only
if law schools also concurrently satisﬁed an aﬃrmative “duty to ameliorate”
the eﬀects of the military’s on-campus discriminatory practices. Taken by
surprise, and resistant to change in general, law schools around the country
had a decidedly mixed record of “amelioration” during the early stages of this
struggle. Objecting strongly to this misuse of students as policy pawns and
20.

This account is based on personal experience and the two section reports of 1997–98
referenced below. See infra notes 22–23.

21.

For further background on this historic AALS step, see Barbara J. Cox, Time for a Change:
Twenty Years After the “Working Group” Principles, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531 (2017).
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seeking to avoid law school divisions, the section, together with SALT and
other groups and individuals, mounted a resistance and repeal campaign. We
began with information gathering, collectively improvising and developing
strategies for community action, both locally and nationally, that culminated
with organized public advocacy to achieve legislative repeal. Along the way,
in an early example of social media activism, we mounted sustained email and
Internet-based eﬀorts to accentuate nimble actions locally while remaining in
concert nationally.
It took time, but this loose and diverse combination of labors worked.
Two years later, in 1999, our campaign successfully removed student
ﬁnancial aid from the Solomon Amendments. Our campaign had ensured, at
least, that our students would not be vulnerable to federal retaliation due to
our profession’s nondiscrimination commitments. The rest would still be up
to us.22 Across the country, section members and our many allies celebrated
our modest gains.
But the proverbial empire promptly struck back, and hard.
After repeal of the ﬁnancial aid restrictions, the AALS quickly had reinstated
its full nondiscrimination policy, but the Defense Department then amended
the administrative rules implementing the remainder of the legislation in a
way that eﬀectively re-targeted student aid funds speciﬁcally in law schools.23
Through this Orwellian administrative maneuver, the legal situation had
reverted to the status quo ante. The AALS then suspended its reinstatement of
the full nondiscrimination policy pending further legislative, administrative,
or judicial action. This uneasy stalemate remained the institutional status
quo until ﬁnal, complete, and unequivocal legislative repeal of the military’s
discriminatory policy more than a decade later. In the interim, we sustained
multiple tactics and strategies to avoid the divisions on law campuses incited by
Solomon, and to make equality work in legal education despite this insistent,
intrusive federal interference.
We then knew, much to our collective chagrin, that we had to dig in for the
long and indeﬁnite haul.
To this end, the Section spearheaded the drafting of two major reports
designed to organize eﬀective resistance to these congressional and
administrative actions for the longer term. The strategy was to isolate,
highlight and contain the oﬀending employer’s every on-campus act. The ﬁrst
report, dated September 15, 1998, addressed the initial impact of the Solomon
22.

Indeed, our annual program the following year, organized by 1998–99 section Chair Sharon
Rush of the University of Florida was devoted to “Solomon II: Progressive Resistance” and
was designed to help continue the execution and expansion of multifaceted amelioration
policies and practices by law schools from coast to coast in everyday circumstances and
for the longer term. This panel featured Clark J. Freshman of the University of Miami
(moderator), Matt Coles of the ACLU, Barbara J. Cox of California Western, Arthur S.
Leonard of New York Law School, and Francisco Valdes of the University of Miami.

23.

See 32 C.F.R. 216.4 (1997); see also Francisco Valdes, Solomon’s Shames: Law as Might and Inequality,
23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 351 (1998) (reviewing the regulations).
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II amendment on law schools across the country. The supplemental report,
dated December 15, 1998, analyzed the ﬁnal federal regulations governing the
implementation of the legislation and provided a detailed legal analysis for
law schools to implement with locally-designed actions that avoided risking
student aid or other funding.24
Reﬂecting the mixed bottom lines we had reached, the initial report on
amelioration concluded with the observations:
As this Report makes clear, this issue is not likely to disappear next year. Law
schools therefore must respond to this issue with a recognition that it likely
will require careful attention indeﬁnitely. All decisions made now should
include a careful consideration of their long-term eﬀects and sustainability.
In particular, schools need to devise and then institutionalize the means
and mechanisms by which access will in fact be regulated and by which
amelioration will in fact be maximized from year to year.
Finally . . . law schools need to collaborate with each other and with the AALS
to develop alternative strategies to overturn Solomon II. These strategies
range from the legislative to the litigative, but the bottom-line point is that
the current situation is likely to remain in place until and unless Solomon II
is modiﬁed or rescinded.25

This bottom line encapsulated our basic situation as the twenty-ﬁrst century
was dawning.
This uneasy anti-gay status quo then prevailed for the next full decade,
through the Bowers-era policy farce for military recruitment and employment
commonly called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—that is, until President Obama
ﬁnally signed its formal repeal into law, after so much injury to so many, in
2010.26
At that point, at last, the U.S. military no longer was an oﬀending employer.
For the ﬁrst time in more than a decade, military employers on campus no
longer menaced in blatantly conspicuous ways the policy mandate and formal
promise of “equal opportunity” in our professional workplaces speciﬁcally,
and the legal profession generally. The Solomon stalemate of 1997–98 ﬁnally
had come to its legal end.
These two reports not only culminated a yearlong process of collaboration
among section members, other academics, and organizations like SALT
and AALS on the issue of sexual orientation employment equality, but they
also served more generally to ready faculty and students for frontline social
justice controversy—and for action as a community—on policy issues especially
24.

See Valdes, supra note 23, at 388–90 (publishing the two reports together with some additional
information).

25.

Id. at 383.

26.

See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html?_r=0#. See also, Remarks
on Signing the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 2010–2 PUB. PAPERS. 1938 (Dec.
22, 2010).
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germane to law schools nationwide. The diverse coalitional resistance
campaign that emerged from these actions was part of, and in turn helped
to set the stage for, future similar responses to social justice issues involving
race and ethnicity, including our collective professional responses to antiaﬃrmative action opinions that were just starting to come down the judicial
pike during those times.27 The experience of that year illustrates in substance
and process that our capacity for solidarity in community action sometimes
can produce results that atomized eﬀorts alone likely never will.
Those two reports also were the most tangible expression of the many
activities comprising our repeal and amelioration campaigns and, as such,
they embodied the results of the many institutional fault lines that our eﬀorts
had to navigate in order to succeed at all.
As an organ of the AALS, our section was bound by the many rules,
regulations, customs, norms, and politics that comprised the larger organization
as a whole—an organization with constituent schools that, institutionally, did
not stand with us then. Although the individuals participating in our eﬀorts
were free as such to act according to conscience, whether or not the section
could act in this or that way institutionally always was a point of much delicate
deliberation within the AALS. And while the executive ranks of the AALS
were decidedly cooperative with our section’s campaign, they also vigorously
guarded the limits that mattered to them—or to elements of the academy
important to the AALS and supportive of the Solomon Amendments as
federal policy.
For instance, under AALS rules and customs, the section itself could not
directly publicize the reports, nor could we list the section as their author.
Similarly, the AALS prohibited the section from conducting any campaign
activities, such as distributing buttons and stickers, during the AALS annual
meeting and related events. Nor, importantly, could the section work publicly
or “oﬃcially” with other professional groups, like SALT, to conduct our
advocacy campaign more closely and as a coalition. On the whole, the AALS
vigilantly policed our eﬀorts, and intervened to stop our planned advocacy or
actions more than once, even though the association was actually sympathetic
to the substance of our campaigns.
Crucially, the AALS executive ranks, then led by Carl Monk, often educated
us on the formal limits of the situation by hinting at ways that we might
accomplish our tactical, strategic, or substantive goals while remaining in
technical compliance. It was a consequential choice of individuals acting within
and for institutions: While enforcing what the AALS formally prohibited as a
matter of policy or practice, the AALS oftentimes simultaneously suggested
ways of doing justice despite entrenched systemic inequities that operated, in
27.

For example, only a few years later organizations like SALT, as well as the legal academy
in general, were relatively ready for actions that, over time, would inﬂuence outcomes in
cases such as Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding race-based aﬃrmative action
policies in legal education). SALT, in particular, organized a Grutter-related march in San
Francisco during the annual meeting of the AALS that exempliﬁes those eﬀorts and times.
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this instance, as roadblocks to equality. In this way, the individuals staﬃng the
section and the AALS cooperated, both institutionally and personally, and
sometimes uneasily, in bridging during those tumultuous years the systemic
divergence of politically unchangeable policies and sexual orientation equities.
Under these mixed circumstances, the section became the fulcrum for,
rather than the instrument of, our coordinated individual actions, including
the drafting of our reports. The section’s preexisting administrative structure
quickly and organically became the de facto logistical and informational hub
for the coordination of local actions at varied schools across the country.
We became the point of contact and coordination not only for nationwide
eﬀorts from within the academy, but also with Congress (through the oﬃces
of Congressman Barney Frank and Senator Arlen Specter) and with the
White House (through the oﬃce of John Podesta). And, as the substantive
program for that year illustrates, the section’s formally permitted activities
were designed consciously to support our coalitional campaign eﬀorts
synergistically.28 Indeed, our section annual business meetings during that
time were devoted, ﬁrst and foremost, to open and continuing discussion of
our ongoing campaigns to ensure both repeal and, in the interim, eﬀective
amelioration.
Thus, although the section itself could not act as such in many circumstances,
the institutional infrastructure of the section, and of the larger AALS, provided
both an incubator and a platform for our advocacy to drive the campaigns
for repeal and amelioration. In this context, the institutional distinction
between the formal and the actual took center stage. Because of these dynamic
complexities, and as elaborated further below, our 1997–98 experience with
Solomon underscored enduring and urgent lessons for today and, signiﬁcantly,
for tomorrow—lessons both on the power and on the limits of individual and
collective action through institutional platforms or channels.29
And so we actually orchestrated the (eventual) repeal of an act of Congress.
Yes, we did. Despite the postrepeal stalemate that muted somewhat our
sense of substantive success, our timely solidarity had fended oﬀ compelled
complicity in on-campus discrimination. And, again, our 1997–98 annual
program, dedicated to the interplay of race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation,
both underscored and propelled the ethics and pragmatics of this kind of
coalitional work.30 These two moments in our section’s rich and continuing
history should not be forgotten as we look ahead, for they demonstrated at
a key moment in the broader history of sexual minorities in legal academia
that organized academic activism can and does make a diﬀerence, especially
28.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text (on the 1997–98 section program).

29.

See infra notes 31–44 and accompanying text (on lessons to be drawn from 1997–98).

30.

See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text (on the section program of that year) and supra
notes 20–27 and accompanying text (on Solomon repeal campaign); see also Valdes, supra
note 2 (on the politics and practice of coalition in legal culture and academia across raceorientation “diﬀerence”).
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when we take personal initiative and act collectively in principled, proactive,
persistent ways.
During a time of extended reaction and cultural warfare, when legislation
and adjudication increasingly again had become chieﬂy instruments of
oppression and subordination, this grass-roots academic activism provided a
moment of uplift, both immediate and lasting. Though our formal success was
a solitary, limited, even ephemeral gain, our coalitional struggles cleaved new
cracks into the ediﬁce of legal reaction and its complete entrenchment: Our
local and national eﬀorts during and since 1997–98 denied complacent stability
and mainstream normalcy to the military’s policies and practices against the
employment of sexual minorities. And this resistance, in turn, helped to keep
the ﬁres of queer justice burning within the legal academy during another long
and cold decade of reaction and bias against our profession and students. In
our own imperfect and inadequate yet diligent ways, this section and our allies
were able to mark and help hold the anti-gay equality line, within our profession
at least, during this diﬃcult decade. Though at best a stop-gap measure, our
solidarity on this one issue contested retrenchment and discrimination in
our profession until the nation ﬁnally began to awake from its homophobic
torpor, and stirred itself enough to repudiate its own knee-jerk prejudice years
later. More broadly, and as current events put on regular display, that same
shamefully belated stirring continues, ﬁtfully to this day, in the unfolding
context of formal marriage equality. Most importantly, this tectonic legal shift
was established against all odds, chieﬂy, by the social courage, commitment
and activism of sexual minorities from coast to coast during these very same
times.31
This act of remembrance thus brings an important point to the fore:
Normatively, as well as politically, our stance in 1997–98 ﬁnally has prevailed,
even if not yet as a matter of federal law. Even though sexual minorities of
all stripes still can suﬀer subordinating discrimination in employment and
other systems across the country, no longer can we be dismissed wholesale,
and casually, as self-evidently deformed, perverse, or diseased. As events and
headlines within and beyond our profession subsequently have made plain, no
longer does heteronormative privilege enjoy a smug hegemony over matters of
life and policy ranging from privacy and intimacy, to formal marriage equality,
to hate crimes protection, to nondiscriminatory military service, and beyond.32
31.

For illuminating analyses, see Douglas Nejaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV.
941 (2011); Gwendolyn M. Leachman, From Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT
Movement’s Agenda, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1667 (2014); Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When
Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1 (2015).

32.

In fact, formal and cultural changes regarding sexual minorities have been experienced
by U.S. society as so sweeping and rapid that this limited, incomplete progress repeatedly
has been denominated a “sea change” in legal, social, academic, political, and other
contemporary discourses. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 107–13, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12–307), 2013 WL 2337935; John Harwood, A Sea Change
in Less Than 50 Years as Gay Rights Gain Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2013, at A16; Thomas
Tillery, Sea Change: Planning for Same-Sex Married Couples and the DOMA Decision, 44 TAX ADVISER
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Our choices and actions as a section and community were not only right
on principle, but also on the right side of history. But the eﬀorts and events of
1997–98 were not unique or singular moments in our ongoing group history.
Our organized and personal resistance to coerced bigotry in that speciﬁc
instance was but one episode in the turning of larger tides, both socially and
legally. Yet it was an important and instructive episode: Ideally, this forwardminded retrospection will help embolden us, and future generations of law
professors, administrators, students, and allies, to embrace antisubordination
academic activism whenever and wherever we may ﬁnd ourselves tested by
similar challenges—as no doubt we still are today, all around us.
This act of remembrance thereby brings into sharp relief perennial lessons
about law and social change, and about the making of progress through
collective and personal praxis. This remembrance highlights the distinction
between—and sometimes the divergence of—legal action and social impact, or
the lived diﬀerence between legal reform and social equity. In this way, 1997–
98 recalls and re-centers the social importance of the distinction between the
formal and the actual.33
1997–98 thereby highlights a bottom line never to be obscured: that formal
change need not amount to social progress, and that, indeed, too often formal
legal reform has not amounted, and does not amount, to lived social progress—
or, if so, only marginally, precariously, insuﬃciently so.34 This remembrance
shows that normative progress, even if incremental, is what counts—enduring
culture shifts that produce ever-greater lived justice for multiply diverse
groups and, especially, for traditionally subordinated communities. This
lesson underscores that legal reform is a means, that normative progress is the
constant goal, and that a postsubordination social order must be the shared
ultimate end of diverse individuals who believe in equal justice for all.
Therefore, this remembrance also should remind us all that progress is
always, in itself, in process—an incomplete, imperfect, precarious, and inﬁnite
process; after all, change, per se, is not progress, and history is never linear. As
the gyrations of equality’s history in the U.S. make plain, much can change
legally without any social transformation, or cultural progress, in the long

642 (2013); Lauren Markoe, Election 2012 Shows a Social Sea Change on Gay Marriage, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 8, 2012, 7:38 AM), http://www.huﬃngtonpost.com/2012/11/08/election-2012gay-marriage-sea-change_n_2090106.html [https://perma.cc/FH5U-A933].
33.

See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (on this distinction in the Solomon context of
1997–98).

34.

For insightful analyses, see Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2178–87 (1996); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997); John O. Calmore, Social
Justice Advocacy in the Third Dimension: Addressing the Problem of “Preservation-Through-Transformation,” 16
FLA. J. INT’L L. 615 (2004).
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term.35 As we know both from history and news, systems of social injustice are
entrenched, and adaptable to legal reform; moments of change can be illusory
and increments of progress, if any, remain perpetually contingent.36
As 1997–98 timely underscored, the purpose of our actions must stay
focused on social impact in the form of progress toward lived justice. We cannot
forget the law is but the means to an end—a highly contingent and contested
end: lived justice, across multiple forms of diﬀerence, for all in a thoroughly
Euroheteropatriarchal society.
This lesson is of urgent and enduring importance going forward.
As ongoing history, including our own, demonstrates, the culture wars
of today—like the colonial systems of conquest, enslavement, exclusion,
and apartheid of yesterday—target for oppression the multiply diverse
“Others” constructed through the traditionalist identity politics of systemic
Euroheteropatriarchy; this ideology simultaneously yet selectively privileges or
subjugates persons and groups consistently to stratify society structurally and
materially.37 Although Euroheteropatriarchy conjures and maintains colonial
and neocolonial hierarchies that produce diﬀerences and particularities, so
do they create and maintain commonalities and patterns that co-construct
identities and hierarchies based on mutually reinforcing notions of race and
gender, as well as of orientation; despite all particularities, these patterns of
systematic stratiﬁcation matter today in systemic, material, and everyday terms
to the lives and destinies of all Others.
This continuing history underscores, on a daily basis, the bottom-line
message of our 1997–98 section program, as described earlier: Sexual minorities,
in addition to appreciating our multiple internal diversities, must recognize
that history, aspiration, and struggle connect our prospects for justice to
the continuing historical quests of “other” or “diﬀerent” groups categorized
chieﬂy by race or gender grasping for a freer future, and, equally important,
vice versa.38
Therefore, as the neocolonial identity politics of the continuing culture
wars conﬁrms daily across the country, U.S. sexual minorities are not the only
traditionally subordinated group to ignore the critical takeaways of 1997–98 to
their own peril. During the past century and a half, groups categorized mainly
35.

See supra notes 2, 6, 31, and 34 and sources cited therein (on the vexed dynamics of change,
progress, backlash, and retrenchment); see also infra notes 39, 41, and 42 and sources cited
therein (on same).

36.

Id.

37.

For a detailed and substantive discussion of Euroheteropatriarchy, see Francisco Valdes,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conﬂation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation”
in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 324, n. 1148 (1995) (citing sources for further
readings on Euroheteropatriarchy as identity ideology in law and society; see also Angela P.
Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 13, 21–23 (2011).

38.

See supra note 5 and accompanying text (on that year’s section program).
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by race, ethnicity, or gender have posted basic equality gains that today’s
socio-legal landscape makes increasingly plain are in clear, present, and evergrowing danger.39 This remembrance should, and must, help all advocates of
lived justice to recall, mutually, that we really do need each other, as well as
the precious few institutional resources at our disposal, if we are to preserve—
much less advance—the tentative gains of past and continuing struggles in the
U.S. for social equity in the hard and harder times to come.
And no one should doubt the coming of harder times, for the culture wars
of the past several decades show no sign of abatement.40
As we all surely have learned by now, reaction, backlash, and retrenchment
are the collateral consequences of (even the most modest) social progress
through legal reform. As our Solomon experience made plain then, 1997–98 was
no diﬀerent and, as news reports make plain now, neither is today, speciﬁcally
for U.S. sexual minorities; and as history in general teaches, neither, likely,
will be tomorrow. These lessons should teach us—each and all—that social
progress through legal reform, if not vigilantly and robustly protected, is likely
to be ephemeral at best. The lessons of this moment in our history should
thus remind us to constantly question the metrics of progress, and to be—to
stay—critically “real” in our assessments of power, injustice, identity, groups,
institutions, and systems in U.S. law and society.41
Moreover, as the skirmish over the Solomon Amendments recounted above
also serves to illustrate, mainstream institutions that deign to address our
longstanding justice claims—institutions like, in this instance, academia—are,
themselves, then targeted for reactionary attack precisely on that basis.42
39.

On race, today’s activist judges have shown unrestrained industry in their undoing of
voting rights and aﬃrmative action. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)
(on voting rights); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (on aﬃrmative
action). On gender, the pervasive socio-legal “war against women” speaks for itself. See,
e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Feminism, Democracy, and the “War on Women,” 32 L. & INEQUALITY
1 (2014); Abby McCloskey & Aparna Mathur, Opinion, The Real War on Women, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (June 30, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economicintelligence/2014/06/30/the-real-war-on-women-washington-regulation-and-taxes [https://
perma.cc/N9M6-76T5]; Beth Baker, Fighting the War on Women, MS., Spring/Summer 2012, at
27.
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Over the past several decades, this increasingly politicized correlation
between emergent social outgroups and responsive social institutions has
fueled the relentless rollback of formal equality gains toward racial justice
and gender justice that until recently had been thought secure; it has also
fueled the persistent co-optation, or subversion, of civil society itself as a force
for, or guardian of, social progress—a co-optation and subversion illustrated,
attempted, and turned back in the Solomon contestations of 1997–98.43
At a time when institutions like our section inevitably and continually are
beleaguered by reactionary national trends, this remembrance should bring
one key takeaway into sharp relief: It is up to us—collectively and individually—
to make the diﬀerence, both in sustaining the progressive potential of
established institutions and in advancing lived justice socially through them.
In this extended historical moment, when responsive mainstream institutions,
as well as traditionally subordinated groups, are under intensiﬁed reactionary
assault, both—the vulnerable outgroups and the established institutions—
overlook moments and lessons, like those from 1997–98, only at their (or, our)
own peril.
Without doubt, then, the decades immediately before and after 1997–98
increasingly have put a multifaceted premium on our sustained capacity to act,
or react, personally, collectively, and as a coalition—an essential capacity that
is exceedingly elusive for traditionally subordinated groups without access to
established or mainstream institutional platforms and channels.
As we know from this remembrance, none of the limited, tentative progress
recounted above would have been possible absent a motley combination of
individuals improvising together, as a loose-knit group, across time and space.
But, importantly, these eﬀorts emerged and were orchestrated within (and
across) established professional institutional frameworks to catalyze social
impacts through formal legal reforms rooted in shared principles, values,
and goals. As we saw during our Solomon experience, access to institutional
platforms or channels—like the section speciﬁcally and the AALS or SALT
generally—repeatedly allowed us to leverage the impact of our individuated or
collective eﬀorts beyond what our capacities otherwise permitted.
1997–98 shows that responsive institutional entities not only can leverage
our capacity to be heard, but also amplify our capacity to endure through the
ups and downs of contestation, as during the controversy over the Solomon
Amendments.
This act of remembrance thereby brings to the fore in a timely way the
importance of institutional frameworks as eﬀective platforms, or channels, for
varied forms of praxis that are both collective and personal. We’ve long known
that individuals alone can accomplish much, and that individuals working in
43.

As the back-and-forth contestation recounted above illustrates, legal academia was
intentionally targeted in the 1990s for retaliatory legislation simply for having acted as
an independent social force, to deprive it of that capacity, and with the speciﬁc purpose
of forcing it to enforce bigoted federal policy no matter what. See supra notes 20–26 and
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concert even more, but experiences like ours in 1997–98 conﬁrm speciﬁcally
that individuals who can leverage personal initiative and collective action
through institutional structures are best-positioned to catalyze increments of
eﬀective social progress that, cumulatively, stick culturally. This remembrance
demonstrates the synergistic potential of all three levels of action—personal,
collective, and institutional—in loose but intentional tandem, during one
contested moment in reforming, not only homophobic policymaking
nationally, but also the legal academy of the U.S normatively.
This remembrance beckons more of the same in the hard and harder times
before us.
In the end, then, this remembrance foregrounds the combined importance
of individuals, groups, and institutions in the making of professional and
social progress; in the end, all three—individuals, groups, and institutions—
are necessary, as the twists and turns of 1997–98 only help to conﬁrm. Going
forward, this bottom line thereby calls on each of us, from our respective
positions of limited capacity, to daily practice coalition-building and
institution-building as professional and personal projects of lifelong praxis.
Going forward, this critical and self-critical remembrance should prompt us
all, as teachers, scholars, administrators, students, and colleagues, to be always
alert and proactive in cultivating principled relationships of coalition—as well
as coalitional institutions—much as our section proved to be in the crucial
contestations of 1997–98.
The ongoing and actionable lessons of 1997–98 thus serve to remind us,
perhaps mundanely, that both individuals and groups—as well as responsive
established institutions—matter to the prospects of systemic and normative
progress through legal reform. The convergence of the three—individuals,
groups, and institutions—can maximize not only our capacity for timely
social impact but also our capacity for longer-term lived progress. As the
coming years approach, this leveraging of collective personal action through
institutional platforms and channels to achieve a principled substantive result
provides a recipe that should never be far from our minds and plans. This
remembrance underscores that what we do in this continual contestation over
persistent legacies and contingent aspirations can help determine what comes
next, normatively, formally, and systemically—what “we” do as individuals, as
sexual minorities, as a section, as the AALS, as a self-critical profession of
diverse educators. Looking ahead, the charged and consequential experience
of those years should remind us to nurture, through thick and thin, the section
as one unique instrument of self-empowerment and justice praxis for the hard,
and harder, times to come.
As other essays in this mini-symposium recall and document, the very
existence of our section is, itself, the result of individual and collective action
within institutional frameworks.44 As those essays remind us, sexual minorities
had no recognition, no standing, no section—no formal institutional site, or
44.

See supra notes 3 and 21 and sources cited therein (referencing the essays).
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“safe space” of our own—just a few short years before we needed and mounted
the sustained organized activism recounted above. As those essays should
make eternally plain, the existence and viability of our section is not a given,
an inevitable, functional, and secure feature of the academic landscape.
It thus takes but little imagination to speculate, now, on how we might have
fared in 1997–98 without the section’s infrastructure and networks at our ready
disposal then. Of course, we never can know for sure. Yet given conditions
of geographic diﬀusion and institutional atomization that characterize our
situations as individuals, how else would—could—we have timely mobilized,
organized, and sustained our personal and collective capacity to act eﬀectively?
What source or center of infrastructure, communication, and coordination
would—could—we have invoked and counted on? It takes no imagination, at
least for me, to conclude that the pioneering and preceding eﬀorts to create
the section, and to secure AALS acceptance of it, established the necessary
institutional predicate for our professional eﬀorts and collective gains—as
multiply diverse sexual minorities within U.S. legal academia—ever since then.
The ready use of the section allowed us to quickly come together under
a known and familiar organizational rubric, with preexisting schedules
of meetings and programs, and thereby to focus on actions rather than on
basics. The ready resort to the existing resources of the section allowed us to
quickly seize the substantive and discursive initiative in framing the issues and
advocacy. Although we had to navigate the institutional limits and politics of
the AALS, the section served as a spearhead for successful legal reform, and
a shield for vulnerable constituencies in the interim. From the experience of
1997–98 we can and should draw a clear understanding that the section is a key
and necessary—and necessarily limited and insuﬃcient—site of struggle that
nevertheless merits our constant, and self-critical, care.
Perhaps most speciﬁcally, this remembrance therefore highlights the
potential—even if mixed—social justice utilities of institutional sites, like the
section, during a critical moment in the history of sexual minorities in U.S.
legal education, and as part of the dynamics of broader social progress. In
1997–98, the section served as the indispensable crucible to help incubate and
coalesce the individual actions that helped to generate institutional change
with continuing social repercussions. And, ideally, increments of formal legal
change like this one, over time, accumulate to foment larger culture shifts,
which, in turn, can continue to bend the arc of history toward equal justice for
all. This is the hope, the plan, the demand, of our history.
It thus bears emphasis, in closing, that these forward-looking lessons apply
not only to sexual minorities and other vulnerable groups under sustained
socio-legal attack; going forward, these lessons should be noted as well by
established institutions, and those responsible for their choices and in/actions.
We, as a section and community, must use this experience to appreciate the
value of institutional platforms in ongoing social justice struggles; likewise,
large systemic institutions, like the AALS and those who control it from year to
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year and decade to decade, also must take note of the value that sections, and
eﬀorts, like ours contribute continually to the profession’s self-stated mission
and much-vaunted values—and, in broader historical terms, to the march of
progress itself. As the essays of this symposium illustrate only in part, not only
must we “from below” take special care to nurture our section and similar
safe institutional spaces to protect and advance shared values of social justice
across diﬀerence, but so too must the AALS itself, and its entities or agents
“from above.” Not only must we build institutional platforms, like the section,
from below, but we also must work to hold the AALS and profession to its
professed social values and institutional commitments.45
If “we” are to beneﬁt—as an academy and society—from the critical lessons
of the recent past, we must each and all, from our respective institutional,
professional, and social positions, take heed of history—and take personal
responsibility for informed, timely, dynamic and sustained actions that protect
or advance expressly shared values, such as equal justice.
Recalling 1997–98 today—as the same furies of backlash continue to envelop
U.S. law and society without abatement—we consequently, and ﬁnally, also
should mark the important, sometimes overlooked, linkage of action to
remembrance, and of both to liberation. Remembering together the modest,
fragile gains of 1997–98 today should help make evermore clear to all of us
why social justice advocates must know and learn from the lessons of the past
in order to make enduring progress toward a less deranged future. Linking
remembrance to action should keep us all alert to the synergies of individual,
collective, and institutional action in the promotion and protection of frail,
imperfect—yet important—equality gains that establish the baselines for a
better tomorrow.
The lessons and experiences of 1997–98 do not, and cannot, guarantee
that individuals acting collectively within institutions can bring about formal
change that results in social progress. But those lessons and experiences do
show that the possibilities for advancement remain always perennial; from
the perspective of back then, the prospects of success were daunting. Still, we
acted as if not—even though we knew full well they really were.
As we mark the passage of twenty years since then, the forward-looking
insights and bedrock lessons to be drawn from our recent and continuing
experience with social and legal homophobia consequently urge us to be
mindful of the basics that shape and sustain incremental social progress.
Individuals, and relationships of solidarity built mutually, deliberately, and
slowly across and among them from day to day, always matter. These ﬂuid,
ongoing relations across multiple sources of diﬀerence provide the necessary
cornerstone, and glue, for collective action when the need for it may suddenly
arise. As 1997–98 put on full display, it is through the resulting, ongoing
45.
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networks of interrelated individuals that, acting in principled concert, we can
best make established institutions substantively responsive, and thereby can
enlist them, and their resources, to amplify our presence professionally and
politically, and to leverage our impact systemically and culturally.
As tomorrow’s challenges press on today’s generation of multiply diverse
sexual minority law professors with ever-greater urgency, those 365 days of
1997–98, with all their trials and tribulations, and through all their highs and
lows, can and should serve as a salutary reminder of the manifold reasons that
(and sometimes how) we do this work, qua law professors, still and always.46
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See generally Francisco Valdes & Sumi Cho, Critical Race Materialism: Theorizing Justice in the Wake of
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